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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The number and lethality of conflicts has been declining significantly since the
end of the Cold War, but five new armed conflicts still break out each year.
While costly peace-making, stabilisation and reconstruction efforts have helped
to end conflicts, no comparative efforts have gone into preventing them from
occurring in the first place. The international community appears stuck in the
never-ending travails of managing crises, finding it difficult to act early to pre-
vent new conflicts from escalating. Encouraging signs that this is changing
include the United Nations (UN) promotion of the preventive arm of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the United States’ efforts to improve its
capacity to prevent conflicts and mass atrocities emerging from the Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review. Similarly, since the launch of the Gothen-
burg programme in 2001, the European Union (EU) has embraced the case for
conflict prevention in policy documents as well as in the Lisbon Treaty itself,
making it a hallmark of its approach to international security and conflict in
contrast to conventional foreign policy. Yet, it has fallen significantly short in
translating these aspirations into institutional practice and success on the
ground. It suffers from the ‘missing middle’ syndrome between long-term struc-
tural prevention through instruments such as conditionality for EU accession
and development policy, and short-term responses to erupting crisis through
military and civilian missions.
The Lisbon Treaty amendments – in particular the creation of the ‘double-hat-
ted’ High Representative (HR) and the European External Action Service
(EEAS) – are widely seen as major opportunities to make the EU more capable,
active and coherent. We welcome these opportunities, especially the potential
for joint threat assessment and coherence in policy, the improved presence on
the ground through EU delegations and the influx of experienced diplomats
from Member States. At the same time, our paper draws on research into the
warning-response problem to express two main concerns: first, key weaknesses
of the old system are not sufficiently addressed such as, insufficient orientation
to longer-term forecasting and effective warning, privileging of crisis manage-
ment against prevention and divergent dispositions among intelligence consum-
ers. More worrying still, the new system could lead to lower receptivity and
slower responses due to growing information noise, excessively hierarchical
relations as well as an even tighter bottleneck in information processing and
decision-making at the top of the broader pyramidal structure. We argue that
warning-response will always be a challenge and it is unrealistic to get it right
all of the time. However, we advance a number of recommendations addressed
primarily to the EU, which could help to mitigate some of the problems
obstructing warning for early action:REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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• to reinvigorate its commitments to conflict prevention and ring-fence institu-
tional resources against competing demands from crisis management;
• to develop a strategic warning doctrine to deal with the uncertainties, over-
laps and gaps the current system produces;
• to promote a so-called ‘customer-driven approach’ among warning produc-
ers and embrace a number of analytical techniques to improve analysis and
warning impact;
• to make sure that the EEAS does not create a culture adverse to warning by
replicating the overly hierarchical and formalistic culture pervading the
European Commission;
• to devolve analytical resources as well as responsibilities for civilian preven-
tive action to EU delegations and EU Special Representatives to avoid the
bottleneck problem;
• to lend more financial and intelligence support to regional and local early
warning systems/NGOs, particularly those which integrate warning and
response under one roof.
Our paper also addresses the growing importance of the news media and non-
governmental organisations for alleviating the warning-response gap. NGO
staff as well as journalists can offer excellent expertise of particular countries
and can communicate warnings in some circumstances more effectively than
analysts within a bureaucracy. Moreover, early action sometimes requires public
advocacy in order to challenge some of the disincentives to act on the part of
governments and the EU. NGOs also play an important role in holding decision-
makers to account for failing to act despite early, clear and well-substantiated
warnings. In order to enhance the role of NGOs and the news media we recom-
mend that:
• the EU should more systematically collect and assess information coming
from NGOs and aim to formalise and regularise opportunities for sharing
information such as thematic working groups;
• NGOs need to invest more time in understanding how their public commu-
nication is perceived by decision-makers and should become more alert to
the reputational risks arising from ‘over-warning’, moralising and unrealistic
recommendations;
• more efforts need to be made to sensitise ‘news decision-makers’ to biases,
both geographical and topical, in their coverage and remind them that
besides their obligation towards shareholders/owners, they have to fulfil a
‘responsibility to report’ about impending crises;
• the EU should explore how to support journalists in producing proactive and
in-depth foreign affairs coverage, for example by funding organisations that
could provide grants for reporting about regions under-represented in the
media or issues the news media tend to overlook.5
INTRODUCTION1
The end of superpower competition stopped many so-called proxy wars and the
international community invested heavily in efforts to bring old conflicts to an
end.2 But still about four or five new armed conflicts are breaking out each year
with little change observable over the decades.3 Costly peace-making has surged
and often proven effective, but no comparative efforts have gone into preventing
conflicts from occurring in the first place. When prevention works it can save
lives, avoid mass atrocities against civilian populations and create the precondi-
tions for a lasting peace. Even when we leave the humanitarian arguments aside,
a number of studies have demonstrated powerful self-interested arguments for
why investing in preventive action pays off in terms of a conventional cost-ben-
efit calculus.4 Western leaders and publics have tended to be initially reluctant
to get involved in foreign countries until being forced to do so at considerably
higher costs and risks as conflicts in for instance the Horn of Africa, the Great
Lakes regions and the Balkans have shown in the past. As Michael Browne and
Richard Rosecrance have written in their book on the effectiveness of preven-
tion: ‘The question is not whether distant powers and international organisa-
tions will become involved in trying to stop deadly conflicts, but when and
how’.5 Hence, only conflict prevention offers an escape from the Sisyphus-like
travails of crisis management, stabilisation and reconstruction.
1. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the European Research Council (No. 202022) for
the FORESIGHT Project hosted at King’s College London. We have benefited immensely from comments
received from expert participants from policy-making, NGO and news media sectors during a workshop
on 15 April held at the Egmont Palace in Brussels. We are grateful to Sven Biscop for offering to host and
co-organise the event. Thank you also to Richard Heinrich for editorial support. As always, any remain-
ing errors of judgement or fact are our responsibility alone. The authors take collective responsibility for
the paper, but would like to acknowledge that Chapter 2 was authored by John Brante, Chapter 3 by
Christoph Meyer, Chapter 4 by Chiara de Franco and Chapter 5 by Florian Otto.
2. Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole calculate that the ‘global magnitude of warfare has
decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2009 to its lowest
level since 1960’, p. 1, Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2008, http://www.sys-
temicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009%20Executive%20Summary.pdf (accessed 13 May 2011),
see also Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen (2009). ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946-2008’, Journal of Peace
Research, pp. 577-87.
3. See figure 5, http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm; for more wide-ranging assessments of conflict
prevention efforts see, Lawrence Woocher (2009). Violent Conflict: Assessing Progress, Meeting Chal-
lenges. Special Report 231, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace and David Nyheim (2009).
Preventing Violence War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response. Paris:
OECD – DAC.
4. Bruce W. Jentleson, (2003). ‘The Realism of Preventive Statecraft’, in David Carment and Albrecht
Schnabel, eds., Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? New York: United Nations Univer-
sity Press, pp. 26-45; Michael E. Brown, and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds. (1999). The Costs of Conflict:
Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Malcolm Chalmers (2007).
‘Spending to Save? The Cost-Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention’, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol.
18, No. 1, pp. 1-23.
5. Michael E. Brown, and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds., (1999), The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and
Cure in the Global Arena. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 229.REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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We define prevention as deliberate action aimed at avoiding future harm by
tackling its causes. It is closely related to mitigation, which accepts that a poten-
tially harmful event or process of change cannot be stopped, but harmful conse-
quences arising from it can be minimised by precautionary measures. A distinc-
tion needs to be made between structural conflict prevention which involves a
long-term strategy that is expected to yield effects over years, in contrast to
operational conflict prevention. The latter can be defined as a set of tailored
measures aimed at eliminating or substantially reducing the likelihood of a near-
term outbreak, escalation or resurgence of violent conflict within months, weeks
and days. This paper is primarily concerned with operational conflict preven-
tion.
Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) has firmly embraced the case
for conflict prevention in a number of policy documents, making it a hallmark
of its approach to international security and conflict in contrast to conventional
foreign policy. In 2001 the EU Commission presented its ‘Communication on
Conflict Prevention’ and the European Council at Gothenburg agreed on the
‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict’, both highlighting the
centrality of conflict prevention as a foreign policy objective. These documents
aimed at ‘mainstreaming’ prevention into various external policies and agree-
ments with third countries, but also at implementing it across the EU’s external
services, including security and defence, development and trade.6 Subsequently,
one could find commitments to prevention in the Treaty of Lisbon, which man-
dated that ‘[t]he Union shall … preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen
international security …’ and listed ‘peace-keeping, conflict prevention and
strengthening international security’ as the objectives of the EU’s Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy.7 The European Security Strategy of 2003 demanded ‘…
we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat
prevention cannot start too early’, and the implementation report five years later
stated that ‘[p]reventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must
be at the heart of our approach’.8 The drive towards preventing conflicts before
they erupt has been widely welcomed because the EU has a strong and distinct
contribution to make given the potency and mix of its instruments, its many
delegations and the expertise of its members in various regions of the world.
Yet, the EU has fallen significantly short in translating these aspirations into
institutional practice and success on the ground. The failure to mobilise preven-
6. COM(2001) 211 final; Presidency Conclusions – Gothenburg, 15 and 16 June 2001.
7. Treaty of Lisbon, Article 10a, 2c & new article 28a
8. European Council (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy; European
Council (2008), Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a
Changing World.REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
7
tive action in the cases of Darfur in 2003 was just one of the more high-profile
instances where the EU has been behind the curve of events and tended to con-
centrate on crisis management, rather than prevention. Similarly, the upheavals
in the Middle East with fighting in Libya and Syria have taken the EU by sur-
prise and limited its options for a political settlement with less bloodshed. A
recent study by the Initiative for Peacebuilding concluded that the EU’s current
efforts in early warning and response are characterised by ‘short-termism and
ad hoc decision-making. It lacks prioritisation grounded in evidence, and sub-
optimal decision-making contributes to inefficient policy-making’.9 We concur
that the EU suffers from the ‘missing middle’ syndrome between long-term
structural prevention through instruments such as conditionality for EU acces-
sion and development policy, and short-term responses to erupting crises
through military and civilian missions.
More worrying still, this paper details significant risks that the post-Lisbon EU
will become worse at conflict prevention in some aspects, not better as it is
widely expected, unless remedial action is taken. The Lisbon Treaty amend-
ments and in particular the creation of the institution-bridging High Represent-
ative (HR) and a European External Action Service (EEAS) are widely seen as
major opportunities to reform structures and put in place a more coherent and
capable system of generating knowledge, agreeing on priorities and implement-
ing action. In contrast, we point to a number of problems with the new system
that risk undermining early warning and conflict prevention:
• the creation of a bureaucracy where country-specific expertise is missing or
gets lost and where rules and roles are uncertain;
• the amplification of information noise and overload as more products are
being shared without rationalisation;
• a hierarchical organisational culture, which discourages the articulation and
fast-tracking of inconvenient warnings from junior officials and the lateral
sharing of analytic products with NGOs and local populations;
• a bottleneck decision-making structure which is likely to respond far too late
to early warnings and tends to concentrate even more on crisis response;
• insufficient measures to mitigate the drawbacks of receptivity due to differ-
ences in worldviews, interests, and priorities among Member States and EU
officials.
9. Montanaro, Lucia and Schünemann, Julia (2011). Walk the Talk. The EU needs an effective Early
Warning system to match its ambitions to prevent conflict and promote peace. Fride & International
Alert /Initiative for Peacebuilding-Early Warning, p. 12. Available at http://www.ifp-ew.eu/. Accessed 13
April 2011. A further major study by the same Consortium is due to be published in autumn of 2011. We
are grateful to Sebastien Babaud and Natalia Mirimanova (Saferworld) as well as Jort Hemmer and
Rosan Smits (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit) for letting us access their highly informative papers
mapping the Commission’s and the Councils early warning and conflict prevention structures and capaci-
ties respectively as part of this larger study.REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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This paper has three main aims: firstly, it sets out a model for understanding the
warning-response problem in Chapter 1 on the basis of what we have learnt
from cases involving a range of actors, including the United States. This theoret-
ical grounding is important, as many studies in this area are coloured by rather
over-optimistic assumptions about the potential of better analysis to improve
decision-making and the narrow focus on official providers of warning such as
intelligence reports and indicator-based early warning systems. We acknowledge
the difficulties involved in determining what good performance is given that
actors do not have the benefit of hindsight and have to take decisions under
conditions of considerable uncertainty. However, it is possible to identify the
conditions that make these judgements more difficult and better understand
why warning signals are missed, forecasts of harm not well communicated, good
warnings dismissed, and action delayed.
Secondly, we draw on our research findings originating from interviews and case
studies to demonstrate how many of the generic problems of warning-response
are amplified in an EU setting and may in some respects become worse not better
with the transition to the EEAS, or at least remain unresolved. EU-specific diffi-
culties include setting priorities on the basis of interests as well as values, com-
plex institutional structure and different national predispositions to countries
and areas likely to be the subject of warnings. We explain these problems in
more detail and look at how they have affected the performance of four types of
actors within Europe: official producers of analytical products who have some
warning function (Chapter 2), official consumers of these products such as pol-
icy-planners and decision-makers (Chapter 3), NGOs (Chapter 4) and the news
media (Chapter 5).
Finally, in each of the chapters we propose recommendations about how these
problems can be mitigated. These recommendations are not just addressed to
the EU, but also to NGOs, the news media and journalists individually, who
have an important role to play in warning about violent conflict and in some
cases also contribute directly to prevention.9
1. THE WARNING-RESPONSE PROBLEM: 
FROM ASPIRATION TO REALITY
The EU enlargement process, its neighbourhood policy and some important ele-
ments of development policy are typically described as being cases of structural
prevention. Operational tools range widely from fact-finding and mediation
missions (as in Estonia 1992) to pre-emptive deployment of troops (as in Mac-
edonia 1992) and targeted sanctions. These differences are highly significant as
structural prevention can be planned and implemented top-down, whereas
operational conflict prevention requires planners and decision-makers to
respond relatively quickly to bottom-up warning signals in order to avoid risks
and grasp opportunities. Warnings disrupt the normal mode of foreign policy-
making but without forcing it into crisis management. Making a success of oper-
ational conflict prevention is a particularly difficult challenge for bureaucracies
and individual decision-makers alike.
When the EU’s High Representative Catherine Ashton talks in speeches about
the need for preventing conflicts, she does not say what kind of prevention she
has in mind, nor is this specified in the European Security Strategy or its Imple-
mentation Report. This lack of clarity suggests that the preconditions for differ-
ent forms of prevention are neither understood nor adequately pursued. It is
therefore important to explain the generic challenges involved in preventing
conflicts and what we can learn from the literature about the conditions and
factors that either help or hinder appropriate preventive action in response to
warning. Appropriate preventive action is unfortunately difficult to measure
without hindsight, which makes it all the more important to discuss generic
tasks for the actors involved. We identify four main tasks as part of what we call
the warning-response loop as represented by Figure 1:REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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Figure 1: The Warning-Response-Loop: Interlinked Challenges for Prevention10
All tasks and the actors involved in the loop are interconnected. The tasks are
linked because of the bottom-up nature of the process so that failure at one stage
is likely to lead to failure at subsequent stages. For instance, inaccurate forecasts
which have been successfully communicated to decision-makers will inevitably
affect the performance of the preventive policy being undertaken. Conversely,
decision-makers can negatively influence the ability of experts to produce rele-
vant forecasts if they do not inform them sufficiently about what information
they need and when. Therefore, it would be profoundly misleading to focus only
on the decision-making stage in order to ascertain the performance of preventive
policy. At the same time, also the actors involved in the warning-response proc-
ess are linked together through evolving relationships. Both warning producers
and consumers develop a shared history as they interact and communicate,
which means that actors’ experiences with one another establish reputations and
10. Revised version based on de Franco Chiara and Meyer, Christoph O. (2011).’Introduction: The Chal-
lenges of Prevention’. In: Chiara de Franco and Christoph O. Meyer (eds) Forecasting, Warning, and
Responding to Transnational Risks. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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patterns of interaction. This, in turn, can create both incentives and disincen-
tives for effective communication and trust. Warning producers within bureauc-
racies are often highly receptive to what they perceive to be political agendas as
well as preferences and they consider the implications of their warning products
for policy as well as for their careers. Conversely, decision-makers in the case of
warning about conflict do not simply trust producers’ judgements, but often
remake these judgements according with the input of their own sources and
worldviews. Moreover, they often consider the political utility of experts’
knowledge as limited to avoid blame for failure and claim credit for success.
Task 1: Forecasting violent conflict
Early warning relies on good forecasting of the probability and severity of a
latent conflict escalating into violence. On the one hand, forecasting conflict can
be carried out with highly institutionalised and indicator-based warnings sys-
tems providing quantitative outputs or, on the other hand with more qualitative,
semi-intuitive expert prediction of conflict dynamics. In governmental and inter-
governmental organisations, the latter tend to be the prevailing approaches.
Experts can be intelligence analysts, diplomats in embassies, special representa-
tives and envoys, military personnel on missions, journalists and NGO field
officers. Regardless of which method is being used and which type of expert is
involved, forecasting for preventative purposes presents some generic challenges
relating to accuracy and relevance.
Accuracy is the extent to which a forecast is correct in its description of
potential futures, their causes, consequences, and timing. Accuracy can only
be measured ex-post, even though ex-ante we can gauge experts’ confidence
in the quantity and quality of the available evidence coupled with the past
reliability of applicable theories or models to make sense of that evidence.
Genuinely novel risks are more difficult to accurately forecast as theories
could not be previously tested and may not be applicable. The key analytical
challenge for analysts is to know when – as in most cases – past develop-
ments can be extrapolated into the future and when – in the exceptional case
– aberrant scenarios must replace them.11
Main Problems:
• certain countries or regions are ‘off the radar’ of Western actors as per-
sonnel resources are overly concentrated on just a few other areas, lead-
ing to a lack of sufficiently early and detailed information about events
that may trigger violence (ethnic riots etc);
11. Betts, Richard K. (2007). Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American National Secu-
rity. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 56.REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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• certain types of conflicts are more difficult to forecast than others;
• relevant information for forecasting is not shared among analysts work-
ing in different parts of the bureaucracy or intelligence organisation;
• analysts may lack the necessary country expertise and training to make
sense of data (insufficient hand-over in embassies, too much personnel
rotation etc) and/or may be affected by various forms of cognitive biases;
• problems also arise when countries are too much ‘on the radar’, particu-
larly in cases of ‘frozen conflicts’ when analysts may be excessively used
to high levels of tensions and recurrent skirmishes.
Relevance connotes the usefulness of the knowledge included in the warning
with regard to decision-making aimed at prevention and the extent to which
it relates to issues and areas considered crucial by consumers. Forecasts can
lack relevance to decision-makers either because they leave out risks impor-
tant to decision-makers altogether or because they are too vague in their
assessment about what is going to happen when, how and with what prob-
ability. Relevance typically rises with the specificity of the forecasts and does
not necessarily imply that forecasts have to be coupled with recommenda-
tions. Simply saying country “X” may become unstable without saying more
about questions of likelihood, timing and the different types of specific con-
sequences arising from it is not very helpful to policy-planners and decision-
makers contemplating whether, when and how to act. The problem is that
the reality of forecasting is not always compatible with the needs of decision-
makers. Good forecasting of socio-political events (or non-events) is by its
very nature vague and uncertain, while decision-makers like to have not only
reliable, but also very precise and specific assessments of when things are
likely to happen, how and with what kind of consequences: ‘In many cases,
there is a conflict between what intelligence at its best can produce and what
decision makers seek and need’.12
Main Problems:
• insufficient sharing of relevance criteria between warning producers and
consumers, partly out of concern to preserve analysts’ objectivity;
• inadequate knowledge of the instruments at the consumers disposal;
• overdue pressure on experts to minimise margin of error, thus increasing
incentives for vague forecasts or forecasts that are not actionable.
12. Jervis, Robert (2010). Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War.
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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Task 2: Warning about violent conflict
The next stage involves the communication of a given risk to those with the
capacity to act upon it. It is usually the most neglected aspect in post-mortem
studies of under-reaction as investigators look for warning signs, but do not
investigate whether these signs were translated into intentional communicative
acts of warnings. Moreover, whether these warnings actually reached the target
recipient and were understood as such is frequently not scrutinised.13 Just as
spotting discontinuities requires analytical boldness, communicating them
necessitates a certain degree of courage. A former US National Intelligence
Officer for Warning advised his staff, ‘you have to be used to being the dumbest
guy in the room’.14 What he had in mind was that his subordinates were not
alone in thinking about the future – their customers also did it, and did it with
great confidence. As outbreaks of war generally reflect discontinuities to estab-
lished patterns, to warn is hence often the process of challenging the customers’
prevailing assumptions and as a consequence risk being seen as ‘out of the loop’.
The challenge is to persuade the latter that the warning should be believed as
credible and that it deserves further attention.
Message resonance is the extent to which a warning is tailored and commu-
nicated in a way that persuades the decision-maker to accept the judgement
and interpretation of the evidence by the warning communicator. Messages
about impending conflict resonate more, for instance, when they highlight
those consequences that the recipient cares most about, rather than those
that only the warning producer considers most important. They are also
more likely to have an impact when they include evidence that the recipient
considers most credible and translate analysis into a language that is under-
standable. Hence, warning producers need not only communicative skills but
also to know how decision-makers ‘tick’, i.e. how they process information
and learn, what their worldviews and assumptions about certain countries
and leaders are, and on what issues they require a higher bar of proof.
Main Problems:
• warnings may not be intelligible as warning communicators are often spe-
cialised in conflict analysis but not communication, or lack sufficient
knowledge about recipients to adequately tailor the message;
• bureaucratic bottlenecks may prevent speedy and direct communication;
13. Christoph O. Meyer, Florian Otto, John Brante, and Chiara De Franco (2010). ‘Re-Casting the Warn-
ing-Response-Problem: Persuasion and Preventive Policy’ International Studies Review, Vol. 12, No. 4,
pp. 556-578; Otto, Florian (forthcoming) Warnings That Were’nt: Reassessing Warnings of the Rwandan
Genocide, Foresight Working Paper.
14. Erdmann, Drew and Mendonca, Lenny (2009). ‘Focused on foresight: An Interview with the US
national intelligence officer for warning,’ McKinsey Quarterly, September.REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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• there may be organisational disincentives hindering the communication
of challenges to prevailing views and policies;
• there may be high dissonance between the key judgements and the cus-
tomers’ ‘mindsets’ and political inclinations.
Source credibility is crucial as decision-makers may lack either the time or
ability to judge the reliability of the evidence, but also because they tend to
be wary of being manipulated for political reasons. The conventional way
for sources to acquire credibility is through relevant academic qualifications
and/or experience of the country/region in question as well as through build-
ing up a successful track-record in analysis and warning. However, source
credibility will also be a function of decision-makers’ assessment of the
source as politically neutral, friendly or opposed to the recipients’ political
beliefs. Being seen as neutral is not the only road to credibility, inconvenient
messages can also be persuasive when recipients know the source’s political
views well and can thus compensate for biases in message content. Hence,
close political advisors in national administrations tend to have higher influ-
ence than more ‘neutral’ intelligence analysis and military professionals and
may be more trusted when warning about humanitarian consequences than
NGOs relaying the same message.
Main Problems:
• some organisations may give their analysts strong incentives to ‘over-
warn’ which will limit receptivity (cry wolf syndrome);
• whereas ‘under-warning’ may hinder building up a track-record;
• source credibility is generally reliant on pure chance, as impact too often
depends on trusted individuals with relevant knowledge and compatible
political views between warning producer and consumers, rather than on
robust processes, institutional knowledge, and sound criteria for judging
source credibility.
Task 3: Prioritising the warning
Given limited organisational, political, and material resources, political institu-
tions need to decide which warnings deserve a follow-up and which ones do not.
Responding to every warning in any corner of the world is a recipe for either
paralysis or failure, even for a resourceful actor such as the EU. To make this
judgement requires an organisation to assess:
Importance: how grave is the harm that is anticipated in absolute terms from
the perspective of stated interests and legal obligations as well as in relative
terms given that other issues may compete for attention and the sameREINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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resources? As violent conflict may have a range of consequences further
questions arise, for instance: what is the expected scale of violence? How
many and whose lives are threatened? Could refugee flows follow? Are
regional spill-over effects likely? Could international or home-grown terror-
ism be nurtured? Could there be any implications for strategic self-interests?
Could there be violations of international law and norms?
Main Problems:
• policy-planners may simply not know which criteria are being applied by
senior decision-makers;
• different parts of a government (foreign affairs, development, defence,
trade/business) care about different types of consequences and resolving
these differences takes time and may lead to a narrowing down of the list
of countries concerned to the lowest common denominator;
• warnings may focus on direct humanitarian consequences, but ignore sec-
ondary effects, which do impinge on self-centred interests.
Urgency: when exactly is the escalation of a conflict and associated conse-
quences likely to occur? What and when is the window of opportunity?
Which kind of instruments are relevant and what is the lead time required
for these? And how does the degree of urgency compare to competing
demands on attention and resources, especially already escalating or ongoing
crises?
Main Problems:
• early warnings are notoriously vague about the timing of harm (‘X is
going to become a problem’);
• warnings may not provide an adequate basis for thinking about different
response options;
• resources for prevention are not ring-fenced against demands from immi-
nent or current crises (‘the crocodile near the canoe, not the waterfall
down the river’);
• urgency is sometimes defined in terms of the media calling ‘to do some-
thing’, which tends to be too late.
Task 4: Considering action
This task overlaps with the previous one in the sense that both negative and
positive opinions about whether ‘something can be done’ about a given conflict
influence the receptivity of organisations. The key problem to acknowledge is
that preventing conflicts involves costs and risks and that doing so is a political
not a technical decision, as even the distribution of aid can be construed asREINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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siding with a party in a conflict. Preventive action in one case may send a mes-
sage to other groups that Western intervention is predictable and can be pro-
voked. These and other considerations may determine that a decision is taken
that ‘little can be done’ in given circumstances. The two key judgements revolve
around:
Feasibility: is it possible to achieve the objectives of prevention with the
resources available in the short and the medium-term? How likely is it that
the necessary political will can be mobilised and sustained in the short and
medium-term? What are the costs and benefits of different kinds of action
that could be contemplated to address the threat?
Main Problems:
• warnings are often communicated too late for the mobilisation of the
available instruments;
• there is systematic asynchrony between operational and political feasibil-
ity, i.e. the optimal point of use for a given instrument is too early for it
to be mobilised and sustained politically;
• decision-makers may be excessively pessimistic about political feasibility
and over-optimistic about operational feasibility.
Proportionality: what are the opportunity costs of action? Is the use of
resources proportional in relation to the problem at hand and to alternative
uses for a different foreign affairs issue? Can the preventive action required
have unintended implications of a magnitude that is greater than the antici-
pated threat? How can the potential consequences of preventive action be
balanced against those of inaction/alternative actions?
Main Problems:
• policy/contingency planning is too often under-resourced, undervalued
and under-practiced in civilian areas in contrast to military planning to
respond to crises;
• policy-planning tends to take place in policy-silos (military, political eco-
nomic, environmental, migration, terrorism), which means that risks/
costs occurring outside the silo are insufficiently noticed;
• consideration of risks and alternatives may not take place for fear of leak-
ing/undermining political support for action.17
2. INTELLIGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
With regard to Task 1 – anticipating future threats – EU analysts face the same
epistemological challenges as their national equivalents. The fundamental
uncertainties and complexities of thinking about future political, social, and
human behaviour do not depend on what organisation you work for. Moreover,
the high number of delegations, the various CSDP missions, and the EUSR
offices around the world provide the EU with a strong ‘informational infrastruc-
ture’. For long-term estimative analysis of conflict outbreak one should not
exaggerate the importance of clandestine HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT collec-
tion capacities. EU forecasting will thus not suffer from a lack of input even if
Member States’ intelligence sharing remains restricted. Insufficiencies regarding
the EU’s forecasting capacity lie elsewhere:
• Lack of experience in delegations: in the pre-Lisbon era, many of the then
Commission delegations did not have political analysis as one of their prior-
itised tasks. Hence, the actual performance was highly dependent on having
individuals with both the personal ability and power of initiative to be
engaged in political analysis. Many national diplomats, recently having
gained access to delegation reporting, have criticised the quality of what they
have so far received. Personnel from the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN) have
also in some cases reinforced delegations in certain hot spots where the ana-
lytic capacity was deemed insufficient. On a more positive note, however, the
leadership of the EEAS has reportedly realised the dangers of this problem
and reacted quickly by actively recruiting personnel with a political profile.
The continuous transfer of national diplomats, who previously served in
Member State embassies, into the EEAS is also likely to mitigate this prob-
lem.
• Lack of long-range forecasting unit: neither the SITCEN nor the EEAS in
general have a dedicated unit tasked with horizon scanning and identifying
distant risks. DG RELEX previously had a unit for ‘forward studies’, but
judging by the organogram this did not survive the transition into the new
service. During its lifetime, it did neither have a specific ‘conflict profile’ nor
receive the resources it would have needed to continuously maintain a global
outlook. The key benefit of a long-range forecasting unit is that its analysts
have the time and skills necessary to combine a range of methods – qualita-
tive as well as quantitative – when compiling their products and can more
easily integrate the perspectives of both inside and outside experts and
organisations, e.g. NGOs working on the ground (see below).
• Alternative analysis – limited efforts: a key debate in the US Intelligence
Community evolves around how analysts can probe their own presumptions
and develop alternative hypotheses about future risks. Unfounded assump-
tions guiding conclusions have been the recurring explanation to a range ofREINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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intelligence failures in the past and led to proactive efforts to improve ana-
lytic performance through both structured techniques and outreach exer-
cises. The application of structured techniques (see below) has so far not
been sufficiently promoted in the EU context. Analysts working in the EU
have explained this by referring to limited resources.
For Task 2 – warning communication – EU warners are forced to tackle obsta-
cles that are more complex than at the national level. As unanimity is required
in matters of foreign policy and security, all Member States must normally
accept a given warning in order for a response to come about. The European
Security Strategy is correct in stating that ‘common threat assessments are the
best basis for common action’.15 However, a common warning impact is diffi-
cult to achieve – especially at early stages when signals are weak and the uncer-
tainty remains high. Some inherent factors that together account for this are:16
• Contrasting mindsets: a mindset can be defined as a person’s ‘mental model
or paradigm of how government and group processes usually operate in
country “X” or on issue “Y” [and is based on his or her] accumulated
knowledge of past precedents, key players, and decision-making proc-
esses’.17 While mindsets certainly may differ between customers on the
national level, research in political psychology shows that they generally do
so to a higher extent in multinational settings. That is, a multinational con-
sumer body contains a greater variety of understandings and views of a given
country or issue than its national equivalent. A warning is hence likely to
have a better fit with the mindsets of some Member States and less with those
of others.
• Diverging interests: in comparison to other forms of intelligence, warnings
have a closer link to action and heeding them will always interfere to some
extent with the implementation of current and planned policies. When this
is seen as an opportunity, for instance by being conducive to other desired
policy changes, warnings have a higher likelihood of influencing the thinking
of customers. When this is not the case, they risk falling prey to distorted
interpretation and selective attention. It is a truism that interests often
diverge among EU Member States. Consequently, just like their cognitive
equivalents, political predispositions decrease the chances to achieve a com-
mon warning impact: the policy response reflected by a warning may sup-
port the preferences of some and subvert those of others.
15. European Council (2003). A Secure Europe in Better World: European Security Strategy.
16. Brante, John (2011). ‘Why the EU Does (Not) Heed Warnings: Lessons from the Russo-Georgian War
of 2008,’ Article Under Review.
17. Davis, Jack (2008). ‘Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts.’ In: Roger Z. George and James B.
Bruce (eds), Analysing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations. Washington D.C.: Georgetown
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• Different source preferences: a key factor determining the impact of a warn-
ing is obviously the perceived credibility of its producer. Customers of intel-
ligence rely on a large number of different sources of analysis. If producers
have a low standing among these, the success of their warnings will depend
on the extent to which they say the same as more trusted information pro-
viders. There is a tendency in the EU, especially among large Member States,
to rely more on their own national sources than those of other Member
States or common multinational ones. As a result of the cognitive and polit-
ical predispositions mentioned above, the judgements of analysts from dif-
ferent countries are in many cases likely to diverge along national lines.
Hence, contrasting source preferences may further decrease the chances for
a common warning impact.
• Negative warning culture: Disincentives to Warn Early and ‘Honestly’: the
above obstacles also have a secondary effect as they produce disincentives to
warn early and incentives to water down analytic messages to give them a
more general fit. That is, customers do not become aware of the producer’s
judgement as early as they could have or in its original form. Having experi-
enced the negative impact of the above factors, analysts in multinational set-
tings are inclined to wait to communicate their judgements until these are
made more certain by events on the ground and therefore will have a higher
likelihood to achieve a common impact. If this is not possible and analysts
are asked to make a call straight away, an alternative effect of this knowledge
may be that judgements are phrased in a way that they do not strongly object
to any of the cognitive and political inclinations represented among the cus-
tomers.
Recommendations: A Warner’s Perspective
What can be done to overcome these obstacles and improve the track record of
warning providers in the context of the EU? Before suggesting recommenda-
tions, some words of caution are called for regarding often seen approaches to
the improvement of warning processes:
• Limits of reform: the common response to past warning failures has been
organisational reform. Most post-mortem investigations have provided sug-
gestions for how to streamline intelligence communities, improve inter-
agency co-operation, and centralise responsibility. The history of the US
Intelligence Community provides numerous examples of this – from Pearl
Harbor to 9/11. However, the recurrent lesson from these is that warning
failures keep occurring despite reforms. That is, the obstacles to success do
not depend on structure but rather the nature of estimative intelligence and
the influence that psychology and politics have on the production and com-
munication of it. Consequently, while the changes made in EEAS may not beREINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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negative, it is dangerous to assume that they will necessarily improve the link
between early warning and preventive action.18
• More information does not mean increased impact: to encourage Member
States to become more prone to share intelligence and to improve the EU’s
own collection capacities are desirable steps and will – to some extent –
improve analytic output. However, given the inherent uncertainty and com-
plexity of estimative analysis and the unavoidability of erroneous judge-
ments, the obstacles mentioned above will continue to limit receptivity.
There is no way to a priori ascertain analytic success, and an accurate warn-
ing is as likely to have an impact as an inaccurate. Indirectly, the success rate
of warnings could be improved by a higher ‘batting average’ and thereby
credibility in the eyes of consumers. Still, failures are more memorable than
successes as they are often followed by negative consequences while suc-
cesses are not, and one wrong call can easily ruin a solid track record.
While acknowledging that no silver bullets exist and stressing the need of limited
expectations, some recommendations can nevertheless be put forward concern-
ing the EU’s forecasting capacity, some of which include organisational aspects.
These propositions should also be advantageous for Task 2:
• Institutionalise a pre-deployment training programme: bearing in mind the
alleged low quality of the current delegation reporting, the EEAS would be
helped by letting its deployed diplomats attend a short but comprehensive
training programme during which the basics of political analysis and report-
ing are dealt with. Common analytic pitfalls and cognitive biases should be
highlighted and techniques provided for how mitigate their influence.
• An EU ‘Intelligence Committee’ and ‘Intelligence Officers’: to remedy the
lack of a dedicated long-range forecasting capability as well as to increase the
credibility of warnings, the EU would be helped by establishing an equivalent
to the US National Intelligence Council (NIC). An ‘EUIC’ could be con-
structed around a number of high level ‘Intelligence Officers’ each being
responsible for a geographical or functional area. Like in the US, these
‘EUIOs’ would be drawn from wide range of backgrounds (e.g. national and
private intelligence, diplomacy, business, military, academia, journalism, and
NGOs) on the basis of their proven expertise rather than nationality. They
would have direct access to the High Representative and the Political and
Security Committee when needed and the aim would be to establish the same
level of credibility that some EUSRs have managed to build up, but at the
same time not be involved in the implementation of policies. The division of
labour with the SITCEN would be that the former focused exclusively on the
mid-term to long-term perspective while the latter would be fully responsible
18. Betts, op. cit., pp. 142-158; Jervis, op. cit., pp. 182-186.REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
21
for current and short-term intelligence production as well as operational sup-
port for CFSP/CSDP missions.
• A professional track for assessment staff: like in the UK, the EU would ben-
efit from establishing a separate professional track for analysts alongside the
operational staff. Filling the ranks of both the SITCEN and a potential
‘EUIC’, such staff could be properly trained and gain the experience neces-
sary to build up a long-term track record. The importance of training area
expertise has been recurrently stressed in the context of the US Intelligence
Community.19
• Warning staff: it would be advantageous to develop a smaller warning staff,
also reflecting the US model. This staff, comprised of senior analysts not
personally in need of maintaining a track record, would be charged with
highlighting warning signals that are seen as too weak for regular analysts
to communicate. Internally, it could have a Red Cell/Devil’s Advocate func-
tion and proactively challenge conclusions and assumptions by the regular
staff.
For Task 2, it is here argued that improvements can be made by promoting what
the US Intelligence Community labels ‘customer-driven intelligence’.20 The ‘cus-
tomer-driven’ approach rests on the premise that so-called ‘over-the-wall’ warn-
ings need to be avoided as far as possible and be replaced by an active engage-
ment in the customers’ own anticipatory thinking. Some of the suggestions pre-
sented below have positive implications also for the quality of analysis:
1. Knowing Predispositions
Firstly, it is necessary to recognise that warning is not only about accuracy, it
also ‘involves understanding the decision-makers and how they process infor-
mation; knowing their mind-set, what they perceive to be the risks ahead, and
where they are confident about the future’.21 Moreover, it requires an apprecia-
tion of their political inclinations and constraints as well as – if possible – what
they are told by other trusted sources. In multinational settings, this stage fur-
ther calls for an understanding of where Member States differ from each other.
A deeper knowledge of predispositions can be gained by:
• Using structured analytic techniques: in order to improve analysis, scholars
and practitioners of intelligence have in recent years developed a large
19. Russell, Richard L. (2007). Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What
Needs to Be Done to Get It Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 119-148.
20. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2008). Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Inte-
grated Intelligence Enterprise, p. 9.
21. Schwartz, Peter and Randall, Doug (2007). ‘Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise,’ in
Fukuyama, Francis, ed., Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics.
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number of techniques that analysts can use to clarify their own thinking and
assumptions. Some of these methods (e.g. ‘Red Hat Analysis’ and ‘Key
Assumptions Check’) can be modified and used to structure discussions
about consumers’ predispositions. If such discussions were held on a regular
basis, warners would have a better foreknowledge of what obstacles their
products face.22
• Promoting staff exchanges and seconding producers: letting intelligence ana-
lysts serve in policy-planning units and vice versa for shorter periods as well
as seconding a producer to a customer organisation on a more permanent
basis would be beneficial in this regard.
• Observing meetings: even if active attendance is not asked for, it is helpful
for warners to sit in during policy deliberations and observe how consumers
think and where their views differ.
• Asking consumers: if feedback is not provided on the consumers’ own initi-
ative, it is important for producers to actively seek explanations as to why
warnings are not accepted or prioritised.
• Conducting post-mortems: most of such exercises focus on the analytic per-
formance of producers. Expanding this scope by explicitly evaluating the
impact of warnings is highly desirable and could highlight when and how
products fail or succeed.
2. Using Predispositions
The next step is to ‘anchor’ warnings in the knowledge about consumers’ pre-
dispositions.23 That is, without changing the core analytic messages, warners are
helped by an ability to customise warnings. This type of cautious tailoring can
be achieved by:
• Bolstering and probing assumptions: when compiling products, analysts
should try to bolster assumptions that are seen as correct by providing sup-
porting evidence and – more importantly – point to weaknesses in faulty ones
by including disconfirming facts.24 That is, they must proactively try to influ-
ence the customer’s anticipatory thinking and seek to lower the barriers to
receptivity.
• Displaying issue linkages: if producers know which issues customers see as
important and urgent, they can increase the impact of warning by highlight-
ing the linkages to these issues, for instance by emphasising risks to national
security, impact on diasporas, or domestic industries. In a complex world,
22. Heuer Jr, Richards J. and Pherson, Randolph H. (2011). Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelli-
gence Analysis. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, pp. 183-188, 197-200.
23. Chan, Steve (1979). ‘The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning,’
American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 1, p. 179.
24. May, Ernest R. and Zelikow, Philip D. (2006). Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy
and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 211-212, 137-165.REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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issues are seldom isolated and multiple connections and implications arising
from a single phenomenon can often be identified.
• Considering the bureaucratic level: another consideration when customising
warnings is to think about the level in the bureaucracy one is addressing. For
example, when engaging with consumers on lower levels who would be
involved in the implementation of preventive policies, it may be a good idea
to provide more instrument-focused warnings. By this is meant warning fore-
casts that include variables that can be manipulated by the policy instru-
ments at the consumers’ disposal. Moreover, it may also be helpful to warn
lower levels in the bureaucracy earlier and in this way sensitise them to the
anticipated harm even if the predictive certainty at this stage is low, and
thereby possibly increasing the lead time for the implementation of a
response.
• Considering the desired level of impact: finally, it is important to consider
what level of impact one is trying to achieve. For instance, if the aspiration
is for customers to notice the warning, a rather clear and simple message may
be needed that quickly appeals to their immediate concerns and thereby can
be singled out among other incoming messages. If judgements are noticed,
the producer can compare the warning to other potential threats, make anal-
ogies to previous incidents, and by this display its comparative importance
and need of prioritisation. When this is achieved, it may be important to
provide consumers with analysis that help them mobilise support among
other actors.
3. Approximating Predispositions
It is further helpful to think about how to approximate predispositions and by
this pre-empt disagreements between Member States. This aim can be promoted
by establishing:
• Joint seminars to discuss analytic issues: to occasionally have the possibility
to discuss broad assumptions and where they diverge may be a way to pro-
mote a better understanding for one’s own and others’ biases. Structured
techniques may be employed also for this.25
• Consumer handbooks: furthermore, the long-term effects of predispositions
may be mitigated by simply explaining their influence to recipients. This
could be done by so-called consumer handbooks. In the US, these are long
used but have been rather cursory and not gone much beyond explaining the
intelligence cycle, the structure of the various agencies, and what types of
products they offer. It would be helpful to develop these handbooks further
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and discuss obstacles to receptivity and what a successful intelligence-policy
relationship may look like.
4. Enhancing Actionability
The ongoing debate among both practitioners and scholars of intelligence about
how to improve the actionability of products has yielded insights about ‘best
practices’, such as:
• Common standards for expressing probability: the father of American intel-
ligence analysis Sherman Kent famously underscored that consumers may
understand expressions of estimative probability very differently.26 Stand-
ardised concepts therefore had to be developed. In multinational settings that
have several working languages and a multitude of official languages, this
seems even more called for.
• Active role in post-warning process: this paper also supports a more proac-
tive role for producers after their judgements have been delivered. In case
these have failed to achieve an impact, warners should try to repeat their
message albeit trying it from a different angle. If they are successful, analysts
could make important contributions to the process of constructing an appro-
priate response. Techniques have also been developed for this kind of deci-
sion support (e.g. ‘Complexity Manager’, ‘Force Field Analysis’, and SWOT
Analysis).27
• Common standards for what qualifies as actionable intelligence: what is con-
sidered actionable intelligence may vary from country to country depending
on their respective intelligence cultures. In an organisation such as the EU it
may hence be important to develop joint criteria, for instance regarding the
extent to which policy options should be included in products.
26. Kent, Sherman (1964), ‘Words of Estimative Probability’ in Steury, Donald P., ed., (1994), Sherman
Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays. Washington DC: Center for the Study of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
27. Heuer and Pherson, op. cit., p. 271-290.25
3. LESSONS FOR DECISION-MAKING
This section focuses on the challenging tasks surrounding the prioritisation of
warning messages and decisions about whether, when and how to act. The focus
on policy-planners and decision-makers in this section should not detract from
the argument made earlier that the success of warning-response depends to a
significant extent on the nature of the relationship between warning producers
and consumers. This can, indeed, facilitate regular dialogue, mutual respect, and
fast-track personal warning but also, on the contrary, hinder warning success
when there are strong hierarchical relations that punish bottom-up questioning
of dominant assumptions and a culture of blame which makes analytical judge-
ments under conditions of uncertainty very difficult.
Problems Affecting Warning-Response in the EU
When taking stock of the EU’s ability to respond, one can note that it has
improved quickly in a number of areas, including the rapid financing of a range
of pre-crisis initiatives through the Instrument for Stability or the civilian
response teams that assist EU Special Representatives. The EU’s deployment of
monitors in Georgia and as well as the ESDP missions in the DRC (Artemis) and
Chad have arguably also prevented an escalation or resurgence of violence.
While a lot can be said about how to further improve the effectiveness and speed
of deployment of preventive instruments (e.g. ‘standing civilian expeditionary
force, civ-mil human security corps, etc), this section focuses on the EU short-
comings with regard to prioritisation and mobilisation before the coming into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It then addresses particular challenges we see with
regard to the European External Action Service (EEAS).
Long-standing & pre-Lisbon problems:
1. It is well-known that the EU struggles more than most states to establish
priorities for external action and implementing them consistently across dif-
ferent geographic contexts. EU strategic documents are often vague on key
issues because agreement among Member States would otherwise not be pos-
sible. This problem is also visible in the area of conflict prevention and with
regard to the crucial question of what kind of criteria should be used to
prioritise resources. For instance, the six-monthly watch-list of countries at
risk of instability needs to be agreed by all Member States, which means that
particular countries can be vetoed, while other countries are placed high for
reasons unrelated to the risk of instability. The politicisation of the watch-list
as well as its length of 40 plus countries means that the organisation uses
informal watch-lists instead. There is no open discussion, not to mentionREINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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agreement, about the criteria that should be used for the prioritisation of
countries that deserve most attention from the EU.
2. The second major area of concern for judgements of urgency is that generally
organisational receptivity to early warnings is much lower than to late warn-
ings. This generic problem has been exacerbated in the case of the EU
because of the political signals that were sent under the previous High Rep-
resentative who sought to enhance crisis management and build-up military
prowess and operational experience. In the Commission, conflict prevention
enjoyed a high level of prioritisation, but was hindered by co-ordination
problems between DGs. So far it is unclear to what extent the new High
Representative wants to continue this set of priorities or whether she intends
to send a different signal about the relative importance of prevention as com-
pared to crisis management.
3. Judging the feasibility of preventive action is vastly complicated because dif-
ferent instruments are owned by different institutions as well as Member
States and require different levels and procedures of authorisation. The com-
plexity of the EU’s institutional structure and the large number of actors with
a say implies that feasibility judgements are difficult and there is little scope
for flexibility in response to changes in dynamic conflict situations, leading
to a fragmented, slow and unresponsive process of policy-planning. Further-
more, judging the potential effectiveness of these instruments on the ground
requires in-depth geographic and issue expertise, which is dispersed across
the system or not available at all. There are no robust procedures for warn-
ing-response, which means that too much depends on individuals and their
expertise. This setting tends to slow down response and impede consistently
high-quality judgements on feasibility and proportionality.
The creation of the EEAS, made possible by the Treaty of Lisbon, has often been
portrayed as a solution to the problem of inconsistency and slowness in
response. We see, however, that it may create particular risks for warning and
preventive action:
1. By bringing together more products of analysis and political reporting from
across the whole of the EU system as well as Member States, analysis may
not become better nor agreement easier. The risk is that without rationalisa-
tion, the ‘noise’ in the system would simply increase. This would make the
difficult job of picking out weak signals and prioritising warning messages
of various kinds even more complicated.
2. If organisational culture is a key factor for ensuring that more junior officials
with relevant expertise about a country are encouraged to speak out and be
listened to, we are concerned that the sheer increase in size will lead to a
strengthening of hierarchical relations and restrictive formal and informal
communication rules. This will hinder the building up of trust and under-REINVIGORATING EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION
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standing between producers and consumers of warning and as a result close-
down opportunities for fast-tracking warnings and using informal channels
of communication. This could lead to less warning as well as to a mismatch
between producers and users expectations.
3. A larger entity with the new double-hatted HR on top increases the risk of
decision-bottlenecks as compared to the old system, which suffered from
incoherence but allowed different parts greater autonomy for action. In con-
flict prevention it can sometimes be better to trade-off perfect co-ordination
of instruments for speed of reaction. The risk is that opportunities to inter-
vene early will be missed while waiting for the green-light from the top,
which may take too long in a pyramid with a much broader base than before.
Moreover, the EEAS may create new ambiguities as to whether it is the High
Representative or the Political and Security Committee who is the main con-
sumer of warnings.28
Potential Avenues for Improvement
1. Empower decision-makers other than the HR and the PSC: under the current
system it is unrealistic to expect completely joined-up government and co-
ordination on conflict prevention issues within a reasonable amount of time
given the bottleneck problem with the HR and the disincentives on national
governments to act early. This means that:
• the EU should seek to empower other first-hand responders such as local
community leaders or NGOs and encourage the setting up of local and
regional citizen-based warning and response systems. They have often
both the interest and the instruments to act early;
• the EU should think about whether it cannot delegate more power to
actors with in-depth expertise of a country/region such as EU Special
Representatives. These are particularly suitable to conduct quick and
well-calibrated preventative action. Their mandates and resources should
be strengthened, not the opposite;
• similarly, ambassadors in EU delegations, together with ambassadors of
Member States as well as non-EU states, can play an important role in
conflict prevention when given moderate resources and political encour-
agement to do so. Finally, core groups of Member States could be the
right early responders in certain countries, so encouraging co-ordination
between them and involving them at an early stage could help ease the
bottleneck problem.
28. We are grateful to Eva Gross (VUB) for highlighting that the transition to the EEAS has created at
least temporarily a bureaucracy-in-flux in which warning-responses processes are hindered by uncertainty
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2. Reinforce the message that prevention is a priority: bureaucracies are highly
sensitive to leaders’ articulation of their priorities in public discourses, but
also to their decisions on the allocation of internal resources and the way key
personnel are rewarded. While operational prevention has already been a
priority in strategic documents, it was not always a priority in public dis-
course and institutional resource allocation and practice. What could help to
change this are: (a) speeches on the topic by key EEAS officials; (b) ring-
fencing resources for prevention rather than crisis management; (c) creating
new instruments focused primarily on prevention; (d) regular analysis of and
reward for preventive success.
3. Creating an organisational culture that values expertise wherever it is
located: the creation of the EEAS is a unique opportunity to create an organ-
isation that is better than conventional ministries of foreign affairs in how it
develops and uses expertise. Conventional MFAs have traditionally been
very hierarchical, unforgiving of errors and sceptical of challenges to consen-
sus views. On the one hand, the EU needs to value the country and regional
expertise of individuals who have their ear-to-the ground and provide them
with channels to articulate warnings through less formalised routes (e.g.
warning concerns papers, regular discussion of wildcards). Warning should
not become part of an institutional/issue silo, but the responsibility of geo-
graphic desks. On the other hand, the EEAS should develop more sophisti-
cated systems of knowledge and information management, which do not just
seek to process more information and increase accuracy, but also involve
decision-makers closely in the kind of analysis and products that are consid-
ered credible and relevant.
4. To be strategic in where to act and where not: successful conflict prevention
depends on being strategic on where to say ‘no’, for instance to many of the
calls for action in current crises as well to warnings about conflicts that are
not considered sufficiently important in terms of their consequences to the
EU. If the EEAS should become an influential actor and not be dismissed as
an obsolete organisation, a success in the short or medium-term is desirable.
One possible avenue for this would be to take over the chairmanship of the
Minsk Group and make a renewed attempt to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. This is a burning issue where a proactive EU role is imperative given
the mounting risks of another inter-state conflict in its neighbourhood.29
4. LESSONS FOR NGOS
Although the extent of their influence is contested, non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) are arguably important providers of both early warning and
response:29 By both location and activity, NGOs are often the first to notice
increasing tensions and to intervene as they usually have a wealth of information
regarding the conditions and grievances that give rise to violence and the capac-
ity to respond promptly even if not always exhaustively. In particular, NGOs’
first-rate information and situation assessments can complement intelligence
services’ products and do represent an invaluable resource for regional and
international agencies that do not have their own intelligence capabilities.
Today, the principle of co-ordination and co-operation with NGOs seems to
characterise both national and multinational contexts. However, partnership
between NGOs on the one side and governments and international organisa-
tions on the other is problematic. Information produced by the former is not
always directly usable by the latter and the quality of their interaction frequently
depends on the specific relationships between key individuals as well as on the
characteristics of particular crisis situations.
The EU has managed to develop some mechanisms of co-operation with NGOs
in the context of crisis management and structural conflict prevention, but co-
ordination and co-operation with NGOs geared to the production of quality
situation assessments for operational conflict prevention remain under-devel-
oped.
1. NGOs’ contribution to Early Warning: Assets and Problems
The major international NGOs have a solid and important presence in conflict
areas around the world. They substantially contribute to structural conflict pre-
vention as well as to mitigating the consequences of war for civilians. Interna-
tional and local NGOs work in those regions to support economic development,
environment protection, defence of human rights, improvement of health con-
ditions, arms control, or mitigation of ethnic tensions. Some have even taken up
concrete activities in the field of early warning and conflict prevention as a reac-
tion to the tendency of governments and governmental organisations to do ‘too
little too late’. Five broad categories of NGOs can be identified that offer poten-
tial contributions to early warning:
29. Jentleson, Bruce (1996). ‘Preventive diplomacy and ethnic conflict: possible, difficult, necessary’, Uni-
versity of California Institute on Global Conflict and Co-operation Policy Papers, no. 27. University of
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1. Human Rights and other advocacy groups;
2. humanitarian and development organisations;
3. ‘Track Two’ diplomacy groups;
4. academic or private providers of forecasting and early warning-response sys-
tems;
5. academic research groups or other providers of analysis and assessments for
conflict prevention.
These organisations are sometimes the only sources of information from which
the international community can learn about a crisis situation where interna-
tional links are largely non-existent, such as in the case of Cambodia throughout
the 1980s or, more recently, Sudan and Congo.30 DeMars even claims that
humanitarian NGOs are major sources of information on all emerging conflict
and humanitarian crises.31 This is normally ascribed to two main factors: (1) in
some conflicts, NGOs are the only actors with access to remote rural areas
where violence, and therefore humanitarian need, are concentrated; and (2)
NGOs are deemed more credible, apolitical32 and independent than other actors
which may be present in the field, like local and international journalists, local
politicians or representatives of the conflict parties.33 NGOs have also been at
the forefront of development and deployment of the so called ‘third generation’
or ‘fourth generation’ systems of early warnings. These are ‘micro-level’ systems
whose monitoring and analysis are both conducted within a conflict region and
whose objective is not mobilising ‘Western’ countries but giving a local civil
society information, tools and methodologies to mediate, resolve and transform
conflicts, especially the inter-communal ones.34
At the same time, NGOs often understand their role as being watchdogs or
antagonists of governmental organisations involved in conflict prevention,
which is not only an inevitable but also a necessary and important feature of any
democratic society. Not surprisingly, NGOs favour the development of third
and fourth generation systems of early warning: they imply that local commu-
nities are empowered to get out of harm’s way and that response becomes
embedded in the warning and independent from the political decisions taken far
away from the conflict region. In sum, co-operation and collaboration between
30. Bakker, Edwin (2001). ‘Early Warning by NGOs in Conflict Areas,’ in Bas Arts, Math Noortmann,
and Bob Reinalda (eds.), Non-State Actors in International Relations. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 263-277.
Also available at: http://www.kun.nl/cicam/early-warning.pdf
31. DeMars, William (1995). ‘Waiting for Early Warning: Humanitarian Action after the Cold War’,
Journal of Refugee Studies, 8, p. 398.
32. Jentleson, op. cit, p.13.
33. Ibid.
34. Rupesinger, Kumar (2009). Third Generation Early Warning, Colombo: The Foundation for Co-
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NGOs and governmental institutions remains problematic. Not only is it
unclear to what extent this is desirable, but also if and along which lines it is
possible.
In support of the idea that co-operation between governments and NGOs in
early warning is advisable, the assets of NGOs, as compared to national and
international governmental institutions, are numerous:
• deeper knowledge of regional and local issues, cultures and relationships
than national or international organisations35 due to their stable presence on
the ground. Most NGO personnel manage to develop significant regional
expertise because they are not forced to rotate as frequently as diplomats.
Moreover, NGO personnel are often better trained than other field observers
like journalists or diplomats;
• greater ability to function in adverse circumstances due to a more flexible
and less hierarchical and bureaucratic organisation and structure;36
• greater ability to sense trouble at early stages and take steps to avoid it –
indeed it is of vital importance for them to be able to foresee trouble and to
be prepared to evacuate their personnel when tensions escalate into violent
conflicts;37
• more incentives to sound the alarm bell due to a different organisational
culture and multi-authored or de-personalised products:
• lower threshold to push an early warning than officers or departments
within governmental organisations;
• lower risk of ‘shoot the messenger’ penalties or being blamed for the bad –
even if accurate – news they bring;
• better capacity of rapidly spreading information to large audiences, either
directly through their members or indirectly through their contacts with the
media.
Other elements, instead, do suggest that the risks associated with NGOs assum-
ing an informing and early warning role are numerous:
• many domestic or international NGOs in troubled regions do not know how
the policy-making process works and formulate idealist and impractical rec-
ommendations;
• some NGOs make money out of services that are most needed when a con-
flict escalates and may not always be objective when signalling an increase
of tensions or disputes;
35. Ibid.
36. Bakker, op. cit, p. 269.
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• NGOs that operate regularly in a specific crisis area may develop their own
agendas that often do not conform to those of parties to the dispute and of
governmental or intergovernmental organisations;38
• lack of awareness of the so-called ‘cry wolf syndrome’ can cause NGOs to
produce too many warnings, which undermines policy-makers’ and journal-
ists’ cognitive ability to notice the most relevant warnings.
On the one hand, if co-operation is not developed, receptivity to warnings by
NGOs cannot be improved and a significant risk remains that important warn-
ings issued by NGOs are neglected by their intended recipients. On the other
hand, if co-operation goes too far it may have a negative impact on NGOs’
ability to exercise their accountability role as well as on their primary activity –
especially when this is not strictly conceivable as conflict prevention – and in
particular on:
• their perceived or actual neutrality/impartiality;
• access to local partners;
• control over sensitive information for humanitarian action.39
It may also have a negative impact on governmental institutions with no intelli-
gence capability as they may rely too much on NGOs’ information and assess-
ment and/or have too high expectations about their quality. NGOs’ ability to
produce relevant warnings has indeed some important limits:
• many domestic or international NGOs in conflict areas are careful in issuing
warnings that are critical of the political authority on which they depend to
operate in the country. Some of them even have to develop forms of co-oper-
ation with the host country to carry out their activities and are not prepared
to put this at risk when issuing a warning;
• NGOs may be reluctant to provide information that can be used to under-
mine the position of one of the conflict parties and generate allegations of
spying and heightened dangers for their field staff40 – the risk of retribution
may be particularly high for local NGOs;41
• warnings by NGOs are often the product of an inherent tension between
researchers and advocates: the analysis is used as a tool by the advocates and
not as basis for the advocacy. This often causes the warnings to be ideologi-
cal more than ‘scientific’;
38. Ibid.
39. Bakker, op. cit, p. 271.
40. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997). Preventing deadly conflict. New York:
Carnegie Corporation of New York.
41. Rotberg, Robert (1996). ‘Conclusions: NGOs, early warning, early action, and preventive diplomacy,’
in Robert Rotberg (ed.), Vigilance and Vengeance. NGOs preventing ethnic conflict in divided societies.
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• warnings by NGOs are often transmitted via very long reports and are
noticed only when translated into brief statements for the press or when
NGO representatives meet policy-makers in more or less formal meetings.
NGOs that do have warning as their primary activity seem better equipped to
produce actionable early warning as they do not suffer from tensions arising
from conflicting interests. Very often, as in the case of the International Crisis
Group, they are also more familiar with the policy-making process and have
direct contacts with diplomats and politicians, which allows them to better
understand the complexities and constraints faced by policy-makers as well as
to be seen as more credible. They can, however, be weaker than other NGOs
with regards to presence in the field and knowledge of local society and culture.
2. NGOs in the EU system
In the last 15 years, the EU has co-operated with civil society on the prevention
of violent conflicts mainly by funding NGOs’ activities. While co-operation
between NGOs and EU institutions and decision-making bodies for structural
prevention and crisis management has been promoted and formalised by a series
of EU documents, co-operation and especially co-ordination with regard to
early warning and situation assessment remain underdeveloped.
The EU has formally recognised the importance of NGOs first with the Cotonou
Agreement (2000) and then by adopting the EU Programme for the Prevention
of Violent Conflicts in Gothenburg (2001). The latter acknowledged that
‘exchange of information, dialogue and practical co-operation with humanitar-
ian actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), rele-
vant non-governmental and academic organisations should also be strength-
ened.’42 Afterwards, in approving the Programme, the EU Parliament recog-
nised ‘the lack of real strategic and operational co-ordination with NGOs and
other actors in civil society,’43 as one of the main obstacles to improve the EU’s
role in conflict prevention and encouraged the Commission and the Council ‘to
make use of the information gathered by third parties, such as specialised NGOs
and the academic community’.44
42. Council of the European Union (2001). EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Avail-
able at http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.PDF.
43. European Parliament (2001). ‘Resolution on the Commission communication on Conflict Prevention’
(COM(2001) 211 – C5-0458/2001 – 2001/2182(COS). Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2001-0703+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
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After Gothenburg, the European Council has also conceptualised the added
value of co-operation with NGOs in other policy documents: 45
1. the ESDP Procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management
(2003), which noted that ‘modalities for co-ordination in the field between
the EU and international organisations, local authorities and NGOs need to
be developed’; 46
• the EU Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP (2004), which welcomed a
regular exchange of views with civil society organisations regarding the gen-
eral orientation of EU civilian crisis management. It furthermore stated that
‘NGO experience and early warning capacity are valued by the EU’; 47
• the report ‘Partners Apart: Enhancing Co-operation between Civil Society
and EU Civilian Crisis Management’ (2006) completed in the Framework of
ESDP by the Finnish EU Presidency together with the KATU Civil Society
Conflict Prevention Network, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and
the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), which examined how
NGOs can be an important resource of knowledge and specialist expertise
for civilian ESDP missions;
• the CivCom agreement on Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation
with Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society Organisations in
the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention,
which were approved by the Political and Security Committee in November
2006;48
• the European Security Strategy (2008) recognises the role of civil society in
preventing and reacting to conflict.
To date, views and recommendations as formulated in the documents above
have been implemented only as far as the introduction of a regular dialogue
between CivCom and NGO representatives is concerned. Also, a Civil Society
Dialogue Network has been set up in July 2010 by the EPLO to manage dia-
logue between EU policy-makers and civil society on conflict prevention and
peacebuilding.49 Apart from that, the situation remains very similar to the com-
pelling picture made by the 2006 report: information exchange between NGOs
and the various agencies which now are part of the EEAS is mainly ad hoc,
informal, and oriented to crisis management or structural prevention more than
to operational prevention.
45. EPLO (2007). ‘Partners in Conflict Prevention & Crisis Management: EU and NGO Co-operation.’
Available at http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/3.%20Resources/EPLO%20Publications/_Report_Part-
ners%20in%20Conflict%20Prevention%20and%20Crisis%20Management.pdf.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Woollard, Catherine (2011). EPLO Review of the Gothenburg Programme, EPLO internal docu-
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Foremost, none of the above mentioned documents reflects on the challenges
implied by the use of NGO assessments and warnings in the EU system, which
are directly linked to some of the limits of warnings given by NGOs as listed in
the previous paragraph:
1. different NGOs produce information and analysis in different ways, focusing
on different aspects of the same situation and with varying objectives. Even
if the SITCEN, the Crisis Room, and the EU delegations draw on informa-
tion coming from NGOs when drafting their reports, the EU does not have
a centralised warning structure able to assess such a variety and diversity of
information and warnings which often are inconsistent with each other. The
variety and diversity of NGOs’ perspectives can be a plus if the EU becomes
able to collect and assess them in a rigorous manner, while they can be det-
rimental if the EU does not develop that analytical capacity. In this case co-
operation will remain ad hoc and dependent on the specific relationships
between key individuals as well as on the characteristics of particular crisis
situations;
2. the EU does not maintain a record of the performance of international and
local NGOs to establish which of them are credible and trustable partners
and which are not. Without such a system of evaluation, EU consumers of
early warning may hold unrealistic expectations about the depth and com-
prehensiveness of the information produced by a particular organisation at
a given moment.50 Moreover, EU consumers may not realise that NGOs are
not necessarily more independent than other subjects and that the informa-
tion they provide is filtered through their own interests as well as those of
their partners;
3. the EU has proven to be reluctant to share products with NGOs as it does
not trust how the latter deals with sources. This implies that instead of a
mutual exchange of information, governmental organisations have so far
mainly acquired information from NGOs without giving anything in return.
This has often made NGOs averse to co-operation;
4. NGOs tend to be suspicious of the real objectives of governmental organisa-
tions and to assume that the interests of the latter are ultimately incompatible
with humanitarian goals.
3. Recommendations
Enhancing co-ordination and co-operation of NGOs with and within the EU
system with regard to early warning is recommendable, but it has to take into
consideration and be respectful of the accountability function of NGOs. Fruit-
ful co-ordination and co-operation between the EU and NGOs can improve the
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early warning capacities of both. Mutual understanding of the complexities and
constraints faced by either side as well as awareness of the limits of information
and analysis produced by both the EU system and NGOs are the two obvious
starting points to work out what direction such a process of co-operation should
take. To this end, launching an initiative similar to the UN Panel of Eminent
Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations is advisable.
This should aim at creating mechanisms able to: (1) building confidence aimed
at information sharing; and (2) facilitating collection and assessment of NGO
warnings. A mechanism facilitating confidence building could be, for example,
a joint organisation of regular meetings to ensure contact and communication
with planners, policy-makers, political leaders and journalists. These forums
should not follow, but precede a crisis and should be used not only to discuss
international events and present early warning information, but also to discuss
issues related to co-ordination. EPLO’s proposal to constitute a warning group
goes in the same direction, but more formal and thematic working groups ori-
ented at policy-making could also be created by the EU, i.e., working group on
human rights; national minorities; arms trafficking; criminal organisations and
so on. NGOs could be invited to participate according to their expertise and/or
field competence and credibility/trustfulness. There could be a small group of
‘permanent members’ but NGOs should be given the possibility to enter or leave
the group according to their willingness and capacity to cooperate. Equally
important is that NGOs are given the possibility of participating in the annual
reviews of the EEAS in order to reduce the existing tensions between their
accountability role and co-operation with the EEAS. As stated already in Chap-
ter 3, the EU could also fund those NGOs that are developing local and regional
citizen-based warning and response systems. We believe that while the accredi-
tation system in place at the UN can be a case of extreme and risky institution-
alisation of NGOs, the system of co-operation set by ECOWAS can instead
work as a sustainable model.51
Collection and assessment of NGO warnings, instead, can be improved
throughout the whole EEAS system, both locally and in Brussels. The EEAS
should be given a structure able to assess information coming from NGOs and
maintain a track record of NGOs performance. The EU could also share with
NGOs its own criteria, if any, to qualify warning as actionable as well as to
express probability and type of harm. NGOs, in turn, can enhance actionability
and communication of their warning by transforming existing warning prod-
51. See The Economic Community of West African States (2008). The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention
Framework. Available at www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/WCPF_final.pdf. Accessed 11 May
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ucts: (a) statements and reports could be crafted through a more policy-oriented
and less moralising approach; and (b) could aim to be as concise and brief as
possible. Developing a specific strategy to increase visibility of the warning in
the media and at the same time control the negative aspects of mediatisation is
also advisable. NGOs could also facilitate comparison, assessment and integra-
tion of information by preferring explicit analytical frameworks and solid
research inputs over straight forward lobbying. Co-ordination among NGOs
and with the academia to evaluate different warning formats and analytical
frameworks would also be useful.39
5. LESSONS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA
The role of the news media in warning of intra-state conflict is an ambiguous
one: no other non-governmental actor equals them in terms of reach, and their
reporting is not only crucial for informing the public but also civil servants and
political decision-makers. Furthermore, the media can heavily influence the
public discourse about warnings and are able to determine how long an issue
stays in the public domain. At the same time however, the news media are fre-
quently criticised for not dedicating attention early enough and mostly follow-
ing government leads or events on the ground, instead of proactively covering
impending conflicts. Moreover, the media’s attention cycles are often erratic.
The resulting recurrent lamentation is ‘too little too late’.52 Whereas this criti-
cism cannot be dismissed entirely, the media not only have the potential to play
a crucial, if not decisive, role for the success of warning but have also demon-
strated the impact they can make in the past.
At the same time, developments in communication technology and the rise of
the internet have led to an unprecedentedly fragmented media landscape over
the last years.53 If there ever was something like a single news narrative, today,
decision-makers are confronted with an often confusing multitude of narratives,
especially in times of crises. Before conflicts escalate, however, traditional
media, particularly elite news media, have retained their role in being a major
provider of information. For this reason, this discussion focuses on European
and US professional news media with political decision-makers and ‘Western’
publics as audiences.
1. What role for the news media?
The EU – a special media environment
Most media organisations address national audiences and produce news accord-
ingly, focusing on topics they deem most interesting and important for their
viewers, listeners and readers. There are only a few ‘European’ media outlets in
the sense that European Affairs are their main point of reference, for example
Euronews, a TV satellite outlet, the European Voice, a weekly newspaper, and
EUobserver, an online ‘newspaper’. Apart from that, there is no major news
outlet addressing a ‘European’ audience and selecting its news on the basis of
52. Gowing, Nik (1997). ‘Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention.’ Carnegie Com-
mission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York: Carnegie Corporation; Jakobsen, Peter V. (2000).
‘Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible
and Indirect.’ Journal of Peace Research, 37:2, pp. 131-43.
53. Gowing, Nik (2009). ‘Skyful of Lies’ and Black Swans. The New Tyranny of Shifting Information
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what might be essential to know for a ‘European’ public and its decision-mak-
ers. The main media outlets with the strongest focus on Brussels are the Finan-
cial Times (FT) and the Economist as well as, though to a lesser degree, the
International Herald Tribune and Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Furthermore, rep-
resenting a second tier, the main national quality newspapers, such as the
Guardian, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, El Pais, Le Monde to name just a
few, also play an important role in Brussels. The FT, coming closest to a daily
‘Brussels paper’, has a special place in mediatised political discourses at the EU-
level. However, it has a certain bias in favour of economic and business issues,
a characteristic it shares with the WSJ and, less pronounced, the Economist.
Whereas these ‘transnational’ elite news organisations may be most effective in
performing the functions discussed below in relation to European foreign
affairs, they only do so in an even more limited fashion than ‘national’ media
outlets. Compared to other foreign policy areas, in which the EU has developed
and is further developing own capacities to rely on, national news outlets remain
the dominant actors in the media sphere.
The role(s) of the news media
The news media’s role in warning processes can be divided into four different
functions:
1. an informing function;
2. an amplifying function;
3. an advocacy function;
4. a warning function;
Informing decision-makers and the public
The last years have seen an unprecedented proliferation of web-based news
sources as well as an availability of first-hand information that can be directly
observed over far distances via ‘social media’. Yet it would be premature to
declare that the mainstream media has lost its crucial role in informing the pub-
lic, officials and policy-makers. Our interview findings strongly suggest that, as
far as preventive policy is concerned, the ‘traditional’ news media’s remain very
important notwithstanding the changes in the media landscape:
• new sources of information may be quicker in spreading ‘the news’ but they
often lack the credibility of established news organisations and struggle for
being noticed and taken seriously. With the exception of some NGOs, for
example the International Crisis Group or Human Rights Watch, and expert
bloggers, they hardly deliver the kind of in-depth analysis and background
information provided by professional news organisations, in particular the
quality ‘print media’. This specific type of news coverage represents an
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stages of an escalation process, media coverage can serve decision-makers
with ‘strategic notice’ by highlighting potentially harmful developments
looming beyond the horizon;54
• media coverage of impending conflicts can furthermore create an informa-
tion environment conducive to both the communication and reception of
warnings given by other sources. If a simmering or escalating conflict
becomes the subject of reporting, its overall salience rises, which is expected
to increase receptivity. Even if the media does not specifically report about
certain warnings, they can make a positive impact by putting a country or
region on decision-makers’ ‘radars’.
Amplifying other sources’ messages
As pointed out in chapter 4, NGOs and non-official actors play a particularly
crucial role in warning of intra-state conflict. Although almost all humanitarian
and human rights NGOs have developed their own dissemination channels for
communicating with interested audiences, they still aspire to get direct media
exposure for their messages. This so-called ‘warning coverage’ is crucial for var-
ious reasons:
• from a communication perspective, a warning being not only communicated
directly by its source but also by the media means a diversification of com-
munication channels, which increases the likelihood that the message reaches
the intended recipient. In the words of an NGO representative, the news
media are ‘the single most important magnifier of our voice’;
• more importantly, the news media have a better and further reach than most
non-governmental sources. NGOs with a few notable exceptions such as the
International Crisis Group often struggle to get a particular message across
for the sheer amount of information decision-makers receive every day. Fur-
thermore, there is still widespread scepticism among policy-makers towards
some NGOs, as their neutrality and objectivity is often doubted. If a warning
is picked up by a quality media outlet decision-makers trust, it is much more
likely that the initial warning is taken seriously.
Advocating preventive policy
Media advocacy, i.e. direct support for a warning or calling for action as a
response to warnings, is expected to be a crucial factor for mobilising preventive
action. This is particularly the case when the conflict in question does not score
highly in terms of strategic interests. We do not expect that media reporting can
54. Omand, David (2011). ‘The Coastline of the Future: Some Limits on Forecasting and Prediction’, in
Chiara de Franco and Christoph O. Meyer (eds), Forecasting, Warning and Responding to Transnational
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single-handedly drive policy, as it is undoubtedly true that the news media often
take cues from government officials, report reactively or relay the opinion of an
administration. However, there are important exceptions:
• when the news media decide to openly support warnings or start questioning
and criticising decision-makers for not paying attention to a conflict, the
latter often cannot avoid dedicating some attention to the issue at least. This
may not necessarily translate into effective preventive action, but critical cov-
erage can prompt policy-makers to engage with warnings, if only to explain
why they are not pursuing a certain course of action;
• media coverage running counter to stated policy priorities and objectives is
important for challenging the dominating interpretation of a situation and
helping diverging appraisals to be taken into consideration. In these
instances, we assume that media coverage can promote the importance that
is attached to warnings given by other actors and bring alternative views to
decision-makers’ attention.
Warning of harm
Finally, journalists sometimes observe escalation processes directly and can
become a genuine source of warning by providing first-hand information and
their own assessment of how they expect a situation will develop. Their advan-
tage compared to other sources is:
• warnings by the media can reach audiences that have no a priori interest in
preventive policy;
• news reporting is often – rightfully or wrongfully – perceived to be more
credible and objective than messages sent by NGOs or activists, especially
when journalists themselves ‘bear witness’ and report from the scene.
2. Problems and Obstacles
From the perspective of preventive policy, the main problem of the media’s role
in warning of conflicts is the ‘unreliability’ as well as the ‘unpredictability’ of
coverage. In that respect three aspects deserve attention:
• news as business vs. ‘the Responsibility to Report’;
• the contested newsworthiness of warning and the (un)sustainability of
proactive coverage;
• cutbacks in foreign reporting
News as business vs. ‘the Responsibility to Report’
Under the currently dominant paradigm of foreign news reporting, contributing
to warning and preventive policy is not one of the news media’s tasks. The news
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above, this will often be accidental and only happen if the issue of escalating
conflict converge with what the media consider their genuine professional obli-
gations. As most media organisations are businesses that have to return a profit,
they will concentrate their resources on areas where they suspect audience inter-
est to be strong. As it is questionable whether this applies to distant intra-state
conflict, especially before they escalate into large-scale violence or when they
continue over months or years, there is the tendency to opt out from reporting
on these issues. If editors conclude that the audience will not care about a story,
it will not be aired or published.
Whereas this stance is understandable and might be sensible from a business
perspective, it raises questions of the media’s responsibility towards society. The
news media themselves often claim to perform a watchdog function and various
legal privileges underscore that society expects the media to assume this role and
is willing to grant them a special status so that journalists can fulfil this task.
This implies that choosing stories mainly on their ‘business’ or ‘audience fit’ is
too narrow a consideration. As a reaction to insufficient media coverage of
intra-state conflict, the idea of a ‘Responsibility to Report’ was developed.55 In
the same way, governments accepted a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ their own cit-
izens and people abroad, individual journalists should acknowledge that it is
their responsibility to cover those stories that do not get sufficient attention,
preferably before crises fully escalate. In essence, Allan Thompson argues, if the
media as such are unwilling or unable to fulfil this task, journalists should
assume this role.56 The idea of a ‘Responsibility to Report’ is definitely helpful
from a preventive policy perspective. Yet, it remains questionable whether
enough individual journalists have the means and resources for in-depth report-
ing from the field outside media organisations, paying not only the costs of
reporting but also providing them with an outlet to publish their stories.
The contested newsworthiness of warning and the (un)sustainability of proac-
tive coverage
Generally, the news media report news, and although it is debatable what qual-
ifies as such, the bulk of reporting deals with events that have already happened,
are happening or that are at least imminent. Warnings by their very nature, how-
ever, often reside outside these categories. They are also relatively difficult to
cover, as they deal with evolving processes and the future, which requires a lot
of background information to explain. Due to the complexity of covering sim-
mering or hidden conflicts as well as warnings, though generally newsworthy,
55. Thompson, Allan (2007). ‘The Responsibility to Report: A New Journalistic Paradigm’, in Allan
Thompson (ed.) The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. London: Pluto Press.
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they are disadvantaged compared to spot-news or major events that are happen-
ing at a given moment. This aspect partly explains why the news media tend to
dedicate much more attention to conflicts after violence escalates, instead of
reporting about escalation processes proactively.
Further complicating the problem, in most instances, a single piece about a
country at risk will not be sufficient to raise awareness. Yet lasting in-depth
reporting from the scene is resource-intensive and often leaves reporters little to
no room for dealing with other events happening in the region they are respon-
sible for. Editors thus face difficult choices when deciding whether a long
research trip justifies the costs, both in terms of money and the alternative sto-
ries that remain untold. As a consequence, proactive coverage is rare and, if at
all, they are likely to favour shorter trips, giving reporters not enough time to go
beyond the obvious stories and uncover more complex issues.
Taken together, the resulting unpredictable and erratic coverage is a severe dis-
advantage for warning, as sporadic reporting on the inside-pages is unlikely to
give a conflict the salience it needs to attract attention, get traction with inter-
ested audiences and create an information environment favourable to warnings.
To the contrary, ‘superficial’ reporting might also hinder the success of other
warnings by creating noise or unintentionally discounting them by conveying a
different picture of the situation.
Cutbacks in foreign affairs reporting
The problems discussed above take place in the context of a rapidly and pro-
foundly changing media environment. The rise of news being published on the
Internet without charging consumers is increasingly threatening the business
model of traditional news organisations. As a result, a lot of media organisa-
tions have cut down on their foreign correspondent networks or, as some in the
US demonstrate, abolished them entirely.57 Existing geographical biases in news
coverage can be expected to become even more pronounced. As a consequence,
those regions that from a preventive policy perspective need most of the media’s
attention, will receive it even more sparsely.
Whereas some media organisation have resisted cutting back on foreign report-
ing (for example the Financial Times, the New York Times, or the Guardian),
there has been at least a loss in width, depth and nuance with smaller newspa-
57. Enda, Jodi (2011). ‘Retreating from the World’, American Journalism Review, December/January;
Moore, Martin (2010). ‘Shrinking World: The Decline of International Reporting in the British Press.’
Media Standards Trust Report, November; Sambrook, Richard (2010). Are Foreign Correspondents
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pers increasingly retreating from foreign affairs coverage. As we have argued
elsewhere, from a preventive policy perspective, it is difficult to compensate for
permanently based foreign correspondents, though this is less about the loss of
a certain model of foreign reporting than the quality and type of journalism that
comes with it.58 Putting events into context, spotting evolving crises early and
effectively communicating them to the home audience usually requires in-depth
knowledge of the country where these events take place, reliable local contacts,
first-hand information and the knowledge to relate these developments to the
‘home audience’. With a smaller number of foreign correspondents and report-
ers covering foreign news, the media’s ability to serve decision-makers with
‘strategic notice’ has inevitably suffered.
This aspect is particularly important for those European countries that do not
maintain extensively staffed foreign diplomatic representations and large intel-
ligence gathering capabilities. To some extent, this also applies to EU agencies
tasked with providing warning, as their analysis can strongly rely on open-
source information. In some regions that are most prone to violent conflicts
these days, foreign journalists are among the few external observers who are
able to flag that a potential crisis is developing and explain why this matters.
3. Recommendations
1. Raising awareness among journalists, especially editors, that they can play a
crucial part in warning of conflicts and preventive policy:
• more efforts need to be made to sensitise ‘news decision-makers’ to
biases, both geographical and topical, in their coverage and remind them
that besides their obligation towards shareholders, they have to fulfil a
societal function as well. The International Reporting Project’s (IRP)
‘Gatekeepers Trips’, a programme specifically targeted at editors, offers a
potential way forward.59 Members of the IRP, a non-profit organisation
based at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, take
12 editors from different newspapers, journals, radio and TV to a selected
country for two weeks. Countries are usually chosen from regions that
are under-represented in the news. The idea is to give ‘news decision-
makers’ a better idea about what is happening in the country and the
region to help them making better informed decision about the stories
they select and open up the ‘newsgates’ for these countries.
58. Christoph Meyer and Florian Otto (2011). ‘Missing the Story? – Changes in Foreign News Reporting
and their Implications for Conflict Prevention’, paper presented at the International Studies Association
Convention, 16-19 March 2011, Montreal.
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2. Assisting in producing proactive in-depth coverage and finding outlets for
publication:
• a potential way to help individual journalists to fulfil their ‘Responsibility
to Report’ is to develop fellowship schemes for freelance journalists to
help them fund their research and travels. In the US, the Pulitzer Center
for Crisis Reporting as well as the International Reporting Project sup-
port journalists in covering different issue areas in a sustained fashion,
mostly in countries that usually fail to get the news media’s attention.60
Although both programmes are not limited to reporting about protracted
or simmering conflicts, they make up a considerable part of the resulting
coverage. In the past, participants have produced the very in-depth anal-
ysis and background coverage, shedding light on hidden or overlooked
problems, which we deem crucial for the success of warning. Both pro-
grammes also actively engage potential outlets and help to get the cover-
age published or broadcasted. Traditional media organisations still have
to provide airtime or space but they get quality journalism without bear-
ing the financial burden of producing it alone.
3. Broadening news seeking and consumption:
• decision-makers looking to the news media for alternative views or infor-
mation should seize the opportunity the internet partly offers to them.
Some NGOs and non-profit organisations offer the very quality in-depth
and background reporting that mainstream media organisation increas-
ingly struggle to provide. For analysts these reports have already become
part of their information diet. We acknowledge that there will be a price
to be paid in terms of adjusting collection and consumption routines,
especially during the early stages when new sources have to be evaluated
and credibility established. Yet, this adjustment might be inevitable in
light of the changes in the media landscape. By taking this step, policy-
makers would follow an increasing number of journalists who are now
working in the non-profit- and NGO-sector.
60. http://pulitzercenter.org/travel-grants;
http://www.internationalreportingproject.org/about/fellowships/, accessed 04/04/2011.47
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